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If the world meets the 2C target, by 2050,
there may be an increase in direct energy
jobs from today’s 18 million to 26 million.
While fossil fuel extraction jobs will
decline dramatically, renewable energy
jobs will expand rapidly. By 2050, we
estimate that around 84% of all energy
jobs could be in solar and wind
generation and manufacturing. While
most countries will see net job increase,
China and fossil-fuel-exporting countries
could witness net job losses.ll
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To limit global warming to well-below 2C (WB2C), fossil fuels must be replaced by low-carbon energy sour-
ces. Support for this transition is often dampened by the impact on fossil fuel jobs. Previous work shows that
pro-climate polices could increase employment by 20million net energy jobs, but these studies rely on Orga-
nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) jobs data, assumptions about jobs in non-
OECD countries, and a single baseline assumption. Here we combine a global dataset of job intensities
across 11 energy technologies and five job categories in 50 countries with an integrated assessment model
under three shared socioeconomic pathways. We estimate direct energy jobs under a WB2C scenario and
current policy scenarios. We find that, by 2050, energy sector jobs would grow from today’s 18 million to
26 million under a WB2C scenario compared with 21 million under the current policy scenario. Fossil fuel
extraction jobs would rapidly decline, but losses will be compensated by gains in solar and wind jobs, partic-
ularly in the manufacturing sector (totaling 7.7 million in 2050).
INTRODUCTION
Meeting the global climate target of the Paris Agreement of stay-
ing well-below 2C (WB2C) or even reaching 1.5C requires rapid
growth of low-carbon energy and phaseout of fossil fuels.1 Such
a shift in energy systems would have wide-ranging implications
beyond meeting the climate target. One impact would be on
jobs across the energy sector as older industries decline and
new energy industries rise with corresponding shifts in the loca-
tion and types of jobs that exist within the energy sector. Under-
standing these potential job shifts is important for a couple of
reasons. First, in economies where fossil fuel production and ex-
ports are important, political support for low-carbon transitions
increasingly centers on the debate of jobs versus the environ-
ment or climate,2–6 and it is important to know the impact such
climate action may have on what are often politically salient
SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY To keep global warming well-below 2C, fossil fuels need to dramatically decline
and be replaced by low-carbon energy sources. While the technologies to replace fossil fuels are widely
available, support for their expansion is often linked to the impact they have on fossil fuel jobs. Here, we
analyze this question quantitatively by creating a novel dataset of job footprints in over 50 countries. These
job intensities are applied to output from an integrated assessment model. We find that, by 2050, jobs in the
energy sector would grow from today’s 18 million to 21 million in the reference scenario and even more, to
26 million, under our well-below 2C scenario. Overall, in 2050, under well-below 2C scenario, of the total
jobs, 84%would be renewable jobs, 11% fossil fuels, and 5% nuclear jobs. While fossil fuel extraction jobs
rapidly decline, these losses are compensated by gains in solar and wind jobs, particularly in the solar and
wind manufacturing sector.
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jobs. Many politicians support fossil fuel industries due to the
importance of the associated jobs.6 For example, in the
2016 US presidential election, candidate Trump referred to
coal miners 294 times and campaigned on a platform of reviving
the coal industry and coal jobs.4,7 When announcing his intention
to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017, President
Trump said, ‘‘. I happen to love the coal miners.’’8 Australian
Prime Minister Scott Morrison was re-elected after running on
a campaign that vowed to protect the fossil fuel industry and
related jobs in the face of stronger climate policies.9
Second, green politicians and environmental groups argue
that taking bold climate action, including phasing out fossil fuels,
can go hand in hand with a ‘‘just transition’’10 for fossil fuel
workers5,6 that includes retraining these workers to renewable
energy jobs.11,12 However, any just-transition program needs
to understand the scale of shifts of jobs away from fossil fuels.
Additionally, left and green politicians, along with environmental-
ists, are interested in understanding the scale and scope of po-
tential renewable energy jobs under a ‘‘green economy.’’3,7,13–19
There are three main strands of literature that have examined
potential job shifts. The first has investigated the short-term and
economy-wide job impacts of climate-policy-driven energy tran-
sitions at the regional20 and global levels.21,22 These studies use
computable general equilibrium models or macro-econometric
models to quantify overall shifts in employment in the economy
between broad sectors such as manufacturing and services in
the short term under scenarios with and without climate policies.
However, such analyses generally focus on specific countries
rather than having a global scope. In addition, as these are
top-down economic models, the energy systems are repre-
sented at a higher level of aggregation and so they tend not to
cover a wide range of energy technologies and job categories.
The second strand combines estimates of energy sector jobs
from input-output models (the Jobs and Economic Development
Impact [JEDI] model) with future scenarios of 100% renewable
energy systems to estimate direct, indirect, and induced jobs
in 2050.23,24
Finally, the third strand looks at the specific energy sector job
impacts of climate policies13,15–17,25–30 using energy systems
models to analyze changes in energy jobs, between energy tech-
nologies such as coal and solar; job categories such as coal
mining and solar manufacturing; and regions under various sce-
narios. This third type of analysis is important in climate policy
debates because empirical and historical analyses have shown
that some types of energy workers, such as coal miners or oil
extraction workers, exert greater political influence because of
their ability to physically control the flow of fuel, due to their
higher unionization rates and their iconic status.31,32
Our work builds on the third body of literature. The past work
on energy-sector-specific analyses has been conducted on a
small set of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries15,17,25–30 or relied mainly on
empirical data from OECD country employment factors (i.e.,
how many workers are employed per unit of electrical and
refining capacity or fuel production) to estimate energy job im-
pacts globally13,33 or in other countries.16 While these analyses
have been useful in understanding future shifts, they have lim-
itations. The OECD-only analyses do not capture the large
number of jobs in non-OECD countries such as India, Brazil,
and China where energy production and demand is expected
to continue to grow. Applying modified OECD job numbers to
non-OECD contexts13,33 fails to capture the very different labor
conditions that lead to differences in job numbers per unit of
energy production. Overall, we find that employment factors
vary greatly between different regions of the world; for
example, we find that extracting one million tonnes of coal in
India takes an order of magnitude more workers than in the
US (725 versus 73).
To overcome this data gap, we built a new global dataset of
employment factors (central to such estimates) in 50 countries
by technology and job category and used an integrated assess-
ment model (IAM) to investigate the impact of the global climate
targets of WB2C on energy sector employment by energy tech-
nologies, job categories, and regions. Specifically, we focus on
quantifying the impact of energy system changes on ‘‘direct
jobs,’’ or jobs that relate to core activities involved in energy sup-
ply chains15,17 since these jobs are most closely correlated with
the growth and decline of energy technologies17 (see experi-
mental procedures).
By doing so, we increase the spatial coverage of the dataset
by including data from China, India, Russia, Mexico, Brazil,
Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and others, and create a full country, tech-
nology, and jobs category dataset based on the best available
data for each country. Moreover, despite the wide use of IAMs
in influential Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) reports, no study has used an IAM for energy jobs anal-
ysis. Thus, our paper also represents amethodological contribu-
tion of applying job analysis in these influential tools, highlighting
that, in the WB2C scenarios, the number of energy system jobs
typically increases. Our results show that, today, approximately
18million people are directly employed in the energy sector: 12.6
million people in fossil fuel industries, 4.6million in renewable en-
ergy industries, and 0.8million in the nuclear industry (Figure S6).
Out of the 12.6 million people employed in fossil fuel industries,
about 9.2 million are employed in fossil fuel extraction sectors
(coal mining and oil and gas extraction). This is an important
finding as it indicates that extraction sectors are where govern-
ments need to focus their efforts in order to create just-transition
policies as the extraction sector is more vulnerable to decarbon-
ization than other energy sectors.
RESULTS
Measuring and modeling energy jobs
We first compiled a comprehensive global dataset of employ-
ment factors for nearly 50 countries spanning 11 energy technol-
ogies and five job categories (construction and installation, oper-
ations and maintenance (O&M), manufacturing, fuel production,
and refining) using scientific articles, publicly available govern-
ment or consultancy reports, national databases, annual reports
and official documents of leading energy companies, and corre-
spondence with trade unions (see experimental procedures). All
in all, our jobs dataset directly covers 80% of the total estimated
global jobs from energy production and conversion processes
and represents all major fossil-fuel-producing countries (note
S1 and Figure S1). We then used the World Induced Technical
Change Hybrid (WITCH) IAM to project the future energy jobs un-
der both a reference scenario and WB2C scenario.
ll
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We used a supply-chain approach to determine the equivalent
core activities for each of the energy sectors (note S2). For each
energy technology, we focused on the most significant direct
jobs and collected data to be able to calculate employment fac-
tors for each energy technology and job category.We accounted
for the fact that construction jobs are temporary by converting
from job years/gigawatt (GW; the original units) to jobs/GW
based on the number of years for construction (see experimental
procedures, Table S1). As a result, the number of jobs we report
is full-time jobs/GW.
Table 1 shows the energy technologies and the job categories
included in our analysis. In this paper, we are missing only two
entries, namely fuel production for biofuels and biomass and
the equipment manufacturing of these sectors. We excluded
these categories due to the lack of data. We define the job cat-
egories as follows:
d Manufacturing jobs: these are jobs involved in
manufacturing equipment related to energy technologies.
d Construction and installation jobs: these are jobs involved
in actual construction of power plants and installation of
equipment in those power plants.
d O&M jobs: these are jobs involved in running andmaintain-
ing power plants.
d Fuel production jobs: these are jobs involved in the extrac-
tion of fossil fuels and uranium.
d Refining jobs: these are jobs involved in refining of
crude oil.
We run six scenarios: three reference scenarios, which as-
sume a continuation of current policies, and three WB2C sce-
narios, which ensure global warming stays well-below 2C. For
creating the reference scenario, the model starts with the
currently implemented policies (until 2020) and we extrapolate
the implied emission intensity improvement afterward (see
experimental procedures). For creating the WB2C pathways,
we used the globally estimated peak carbon budget (742 giga-
tonnes of CO2 [GtCO2] for the period 2011–2100),
34 for creating
scenarios to meet the WB2C target. To ensure the robustness of
our results, we explored both reference and WB2C scenarios
using the standard shared socioeconomic pathways (SSP)
storylines,35 which are designed to explore a wide range of so-
cioeconomic and technological assumptions relevant for climate
change policy and have been widely used for similar what-if an-
alyses.36 Here, we focus on the key challenge of climate change
mitigation and thus present our main results for a middle-of-the
road scenario (SSP2), where socioeconomic trends and techno-
logical change follow historical trends. We also test if any of our
key findings change under a fossil-rich world (SSP3), where
climate change mitigation becomes a larger challenge, and, un-
der a sustainable world (SSP1), rich in green technologies.
Finally, in all six pathways, we incorporated labor productivity
improvements by assuming that the employment factors in
non-OECD countries converge linearly toward the mean in the
OECD regions by 2050 (see experimental procedures). We did
this because previous work has shown that non-OECD countries
currently have more jobs per unit of electricity because these
countries have more labor-intensive practices, but, in the future,
there may be improvements in labor productivity.13
Figure S2 shows baseline gross domestic product (GDP) and
population drivers across scenarios, Figures 6 and S3 show the
primary energy mix, and Figure S4 shows the electricity mix for
each of the scenarios; Figure S5 shows the global CO2 emissions
and GDP across all scenarios and policies.
Our results are discussed for the central estimate and SSP2,
and we report uncertainty ranges in brackets for the other
SSPs as well as when our conclusions are not robust under a
given SSP.
Future renewable energy manufacturing jobs differ from other
job categories as there is nothing physically tying these jobs to a
particular geography in the same way that coal mining has to
happen where coal deposits are located. There is some argu-
ment to be made that countries with current manufacturing ca-
pacity would be at an advantage for having future manufacturing
(and jobs) occur there. However, we cannot make any strong as-
sumptions about what proportion of future manufacturing jobs
would happen in the same countries of today. Historical evi-
dence shows that, for manufacturing sectors, first-mover advan-
tage is not supreme, particularly in the face of large industry
expansion. Data on solar photovoltaics (PV) shows that,
although Chinese firms only entered the market in 2000, which
was 20 years after the first movers, Chinese firms now account
for over half of all manufacturing.37 This shift happened in only
10 years. Thus, in the face of a massive expansion of renew-
ables, the further development of manufacturing capacity where
it is currently located is not a foregone conclusion, and new en-
trants have the potential to compete with today’s manufacturers
with smart industrial policies. One factor that might influence
future renewable manufacturing expansion in different countries
Table 1. Energy technologies and job categories included in the analysis















X X X X X X X – X X X
Manufacturing X X X X X X X – X X X
O&M X X X X X X X – X X X
Fuel production X X X X – – – O – – O
Refining – – X – – – – X – – –
The table shows 11 energy technologies and five job categories included in our analysis. ‘‘X’’ indicates the technology/category combination is
included in our analysis, ‘‘O’’ that the technology/category was excluded due to a lack of data availability, and ‘‘–’’ that the technology/category com-
bination does not exist. In total, 36 combinations are considered.
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is the geopolitics of metals and metalloids required for renew-
able energy technologymanufacturing.38 In light of these consid-
erations, we assigned these jobs to a global pool of jobs that all
countries could potentially compete for instead of individual
countries or regions. However, we conducted sensitivity analysis
by computing manufacturing jobs based on current production
shares for PV in different countries.
Results under the different scenarios
Under our projected reference scenario, we find that, by 2050,
energy sector jobs grow to 21 million (16 million to 26 million)
and under a WB2C target to 26 million (19 million to 30 million)
jobs (Figure 1 and S6–S8). In our WB2C scenarios, fossil fuel
jobs might decline considerably from 12.6 million today to 3.1
million (2.6 million to 5.3 million). This decline is concentrated in
the extraction of fossil fuels (coal mining, oil, and gas production
andexploration), which account for around80%of the job losses.
However, these job losses can be compensated by large gains in
renewable energy jobs, growing from 4.6 million jobs today to 22
million (15 million to 25 million) in 2050, with over 85% of these
gains in the solar and wind industry. These jobs would span
manufacturing, O&M, and construction jobs. The gains and los-
ses in jobs across technologies are reported in Figure 2.
With regard to the different SSPs, we find similar results in a
middle-of-the-road scenario (SSP2) or a green-growth scenario
(SSP1). In contrast, the fossil-fuel-rich scenario (SSP3) results
in about 2 million fewer jobs by 2050. The change in the total
number of energy jobs is a function of the carbon intensity, en-
ergy intensity, and job intensity (which we define in the number
of energy jobs per petajoule of total primary energy supply)
(Figures S9 and S10). In WB2C scenarios, the energy intensity
declines faster than in reference scenarios. This decline in en-
ergy intensity combined with the shift to low-carbon technolo-
gies that are more job intensive leads to an increase and spike
in jobs, particularly during the expansion of renewable energy
capacity (mainly in construction and manufacturing jobs). At
some point, however, due to technological progress and reduc-
tion in the transition speed, jobs slowly start to decline
(Figure 3).
There are some studies that assess global energy sector jobs.
Comparing these studies with ours is not always possible due to
different sectoral coverage, scenarios, and job definitions (Table
S2). For example, Jacobson et al.24 combined JEDI models’ job
direct, indirect, and induced estimates (primarily using the US
data from JEDI model and applying adjustment factors for other




Figure 1. Current jobs and jobs in 2050 by energy technology and category under different scenarios
The figure shows the changes in energy sector jobs by energy technology and category between 2020 and 2050 under both reference and WB2C scenarios.
Below, SSP1 represents sustainability, SSP2 represents middle of the road, and SSP3 represents regional rivalry. Whiskers indicate the uncertainty range based
on the minimum and maximum of jobs intensities across countries in each region.
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renewable energy world. Hence it cannot be compared with ours
as we focus only on direct jobs and use a global dataset.
Dominish et al.,13 which is the only study comparable with ours
in terms of study design, has a higher job estimate compared
with our study. However, even this study differs from ours in
terms of employment factors used and the system boundaries
chosen. While we cover 11 energy technologies and five job cat-
egories, Dominish et al.13 cover 16 energy technologies and four
job categories. More importantly, the Dominish et al.13 study
used OECD employment factors data (the key data input) and
then generalized these employment factors for non-OECD coun-
tries using regional multipliers.13 By contrast, we used country
level data for our analysis. This makes a significant difference
in our results. For example, in our dataset, which was collected
from in-country data sources, the US employment factor for so-
lar PV for O&M jobs is 225 jobs/GW, while for India it is 500 jobs/
GW for the year 2020. Based on this, to match the empirical data
of the two countries would require a regional multiplier of 2.22 for
India, whichmeans that, for every one job/GW in solar PVO&M in
the US, there are 2.2 jobs/GW in solar PVO&M in India. However,
in the previous study, the regional multiplier was 5.6 for India
compared with an OECD country. This means that India’s
employment factor for solar PV was 5.6 times the OECD
average, which overestimates India’s solar PV jobs.13
Growth of manufacturing jobs in solar and wind
A large portion (7.7 million [4.1 million to 8.8 million] in 2050) or
36% of the expansion of renewable energy jobs in 2050 to
meet the WB2C climate targets would be in the manufacturing
of solar and wind. This trend captures the shift in the landscape
of energy sector jobs between old energy technologies (coal, oil,
and gas), where jobs are linked to extraction, versus new energy
technologies (solar and wind), where the bulk of the jobs are
likely to occur in manufacturing jobs. Currently, China dominates
solar and wind manufacturing jobs, but this might change in the
future. Many countries are now vocal about self-sufficiency and
are promoting domestic renewable energy manufacturing.39
A B Figure 2. Gains and losses of jobs per energy
technology
The figure shows the changes in energy sector jobs
by energy technology comparing different sce-
narios (see axis description) and across the
different SSPs.
Therefore, we define these potential
future manufacturing jobs as a global
pool and do not allocate them to any spe-
cific country (Figure 4). We find that the
growth of manufacturing jobs in the global
pool is observed in the reference scenario;
however, after 2030, there are consistently
at least 2 million more global pool jobs in
the WB2C scenario than in the reference
scenario.
Regional employment gains and
losses
The development of energy jobs varies
greatly between regions. This can be seen in Figure 5, which
shows the percentage change in jobs between 2020 and 2050
for the reference (Figure 5A) and WB2C scenarios (Figure 5B).
For each of the regions, the specific changes over time in job
numbers are the result of a complex inter-play between changing
energy supply due to policy, differences in job intensities be-
tween energy supply sectors, shifts in energy demand, and the
role of economic drivers (which differ between the three SSPs
included in the analysis). Most regions show job increases in
the reference scenario compared with today, except for moder-
ate job losses in India (under some SSPs), and the notable
exception of China with job losses of up to 39%. However,
comparing both panels shows the effect within regions of the
climate policy (Figure 5).
Some fossil-fuel-exporting regions such as Mexico, Australia,
Canada, South Africa (except for SSP2), and sub-Saharan Africa
(constituting oil exporters such as Nigeria and Angola), would
see those job gains disappear with a strong climate policy (i.e.,
in WB2C scenario). Most of the current energy sector jobs in
these exporting countries are in the extraction sector either in
coal mining or oil and gas exploration and production. As the de-
mand for fossil fuels falls in the WB2C scenario, these exporting
countries would lose employment in their extraction sectors,
which is not compensated by an increase in renewables energy
jobs. However, it should be noted that regions such as sub-Sa-
haran Africa have a relatively small number of energy sector jobs,
such that even small differences between the reference and
WB2C scenarios (around 15,000 jobs difference in 2050) can
result in high-percentage differences in jobs.
Many other regions (South East Asia, Middle East and North
Africa, Indonesia, the US, Brazil, South Asia, India, and Japan
and Korea), show an even higher percentage increase in jobs
in the energy sector under a stringent climate policy (i.e., the
WB2C scenario). In absolute terms, the Middle East and North
Africa, and the US might gain over a million jobs in 2050 in
WB2C scenario compared with today, while other regions
showmoremodest gains (Table S3). In the case of these regions,
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future job losses are in their relatively low-job-intensity fossil fuel
sector (meaning fewer people are employed). However, these re-
gions also have high renewable energy potential (with higher job
intensities in the renewable energy sector) resulting in higher job
numbers in the future overall.
The emerging economies of Indonesia, South East Asia, Brazil,
India, and South Asia currently have a large number of jobs in the
fossil fuel sector with higher job intensities than the Middle East
and North Africa and the US. In our WB2C scenarios, while their
fossil fuel jobs decrease, the increase in energy demand and
massive deployment of renewables leads to an overall rise in
jobs. Japan and Korea, which currently rely on imports of all fos-
sil fuels, would transition to low-carbon sources under WB2C
scenarios, creating a slight increase in overall jobs compared
with today.
In regions such as the European Union, Russia and TE, and
Latin America, there would be overall job increases in both
WB2C and reference scenarios compared with today, but the
percentage increase depends on the SSPs-led pathways these
regions follow. The precise outcomes for any of these regions
over time and as their energy sectors shift with policy are a com-
plexmix of changes in job intensity, energy demand, anddiffering
impacts of economic drivers associated with the three SSPs.
One key finding is that, under both current reference and
WB2C scenarios, China would have lower energy sector jobs
in 2050 compared with today, due to the loss of jobs in the
coal mining sector. Generally, those regions facing job losses
or only modest job gains over timemay compete for the between
2.4 million and 7.3 million expected manufacturing jobs in future
up-scaled installation of solar and wind, which are allocated in
the global pool (Figure 4). The growth of new manufacturing
jobs is highest under a green-growth world (SSP1) and lowest
under a fossil-fueled (SSP3) world. In Figures S11–S13, we
show the results without the global pool. It shows large potential
job increases in China, but also India and Europe. China and
other major renewable energy equipment manufacturing coun-
tries have a head start over other countries, which puts them
at an advantage to attract these jobs.
Conclusion
A detailed appraisal of global energy system jobs and the impact
of different climate and energy policy pathways is still missing in
Figure 3. Evolution of the energy jobs at
world level in the reference and WB2C sce-
narios until 2050
The figure shows the changes in energy sector jobs
over time from 2020 and 2050 under both reference
(solid) and WB2C (dashed) scenarios. The SSPs are
depicted with different colors.
the literature. Here, we contribute to
bridging this gap, and we find that, by
2050, jobs in the energy sector would
grow from today’s 18 million to 21 million
(16 million to 26 million) in the reference
scenario and even more, to 26 million (19
million to 30 million), under our WB2C sce-
nario. Climate policies are often pitted
against job losses in national politics; however, our results
show that, while the majority of fossil fuel jobs could be lost as
those sectors decline in WB2C scenarios, in many parts of the
world (although not all), these jobs could be offset by gains in
renewable energy jobs. In particular, there would be a large
expansion of renewable manufacturing jobs, which could lead
to competition to attract and expand solar and wind industries.
This is an important finding as current fossil fuel dependent
countries with substantial fossil fuel extraction jobs who face
job losses in sectors like coal mining or others could promote
the domestic renewable energy equipment manufacturing
sector to create a large number of domestic jobs. Countries
like India are already rolling out policies in this direction.39
Our research also highlights some key regional differences.
Under all our scenarios, China would lose jobs with respect to
today, but others, such as Middle East and North Africa and
the US, gain jobs due to renewable energy expansion. While
our analysis shows a large potential for renewable energy job
creation in many regions, future work should assess whether
renewable energy jobs can be created for fossil fuel workers
locally in areas where they live and work. Our employment fac-
tors dataset can be used to estimate local job numbers for
more detailed spatial analyses.3,7 Moreover, our employment
factors dataset can be used across a large set of IAMs and en-
ergy system models to perform a model comparison project in
order for a robust assessment based on different models. Finally,
country-specific studies can be conducted to understand the re-
training needs, among others, of fossil fuel workers in renewable
energy jobs.
Overall, the results from our analysis will further scholarly un-
derstanding of the trade-offs, challenges, and opportunities of
low-carbon transition by focusing on the employment transition.
We also find that certain global developments would lead to
more jobs than others. In particular, a green-growth (SSP1) or
middle-of-the-road development (SSP2) leads to the highest
net increase in jobs compared with both today and a reference
case, whereas a fossil-fueled development (SSP3) leads to fewer
jobs. By doing so, it contributes to the growing body of literature
that focuses on social and political aspects of low-carbon tran-
sitions. The trends and results of this work will also be useful
for policy makers, advocacy groups, trade unions, and non-
governmental organizations as it sheds light on specific energy
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technology and job categories that they can focus their efforts on




Please contact the lead contact Dr. Johannes Emmerling (johannes.
emmerling@eiee.org) for information related to the data and code described
in the following experimental procedures section.
Materials availability
No materials were used in this study.
Data and code availability
The dataset and code generated during this study are available at Github:
https://github.com/witch-team/energy-jobs-dataset.
Methodology
In this paper, we created an original dataset of energy sector jobs covering 11
energy technologies (coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydropower, solar PV, concen-
trated solar power [CSP], biofuels, wind onshore, wind offshore, solid biomass)
and five job categories (construction and installation, O&M, manufacturing,
fuel production, and refining) and used the IAMWITCH to create two scenarios
representing six pathways (Figure 6 shows primary energy for each pathway).
Energy jobs data collection
Our dataset includes detailed country level employment factors for over 50
countries, including key fossil-fuel-based economies previously missing in
the literature,13 such as China, India, Canada, Russia, South Africa, Australia,
Brazil, and the Middle East (Figure S1). We collected data on direct jobs in the
energy sector; that is, jobs that relate to core activities involved in energy sup-
ply chains.15,17 We focus on direct jobs as these jobs unequivocally correlate
to the rate of growth of energy technologies.17 This excludes indirect jobs
related to government oversight in the energy sector and research organisa-
tions,15,17 which cannot be allocated to a specific energy technology or job
category. Moreover, fuel transport is also considered an indirect job and is
also difficult to estimate as it is often a service provided by non-energy firms
or can be largely informal (e.g., coal transport in India).15 However, we
acknowledge that including indirect jobs assessment is important, and future
scholarly work can focus on this.
We used a supply-chain approach to determine the equivalent core activ-
ities for each of the energy sectors (note S2). Focusing on the most significant
direct jobs for every energy technology, we collected employment factors
data, or how many workers are employed per unit of energy for each energy
sector and job category.
In order to collate data on employment factors, we first collected country-
specific employment factors data published in the academic literature, gov-
ernment reports, and reports bywell-known international organizations or con-
sultancies. If the data were not already available in the form of employment
factors, our second approach was to collect the most up-to-date number of
jobs for different energy technologies disaggregated into job categories in
different countries and then divide these job numbers by the respective energy
capacity and/or amount of fuel produced associated with that country, energy
technology, or job category (Figure S14). For this approach, in addition to
collating current job numbers published in the literature and reports, we
drew from annual reports, sustainability reports, prospectus documents, and
Figure 4. Manufacturing jobs over time in solar and wind industries represented as a global pool
Solar and wind manufacturing jobs are nearly always higher in WB2C scenarios compared with reference scenario. Shaded areas indicate the uncertainty range.
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official Websites of leading oil and gas companies like Saudi Aramco (Saudi
Arabia), Gazprom (Russia), Sinopec (China), Kuwait National Petroleum Com-
pany (Kuwait), PetroVietnam (Vietnam), and Pemex (Mexico), or from leading
coal companies such as Coal India (India), Eskom (South Africa), and SUEK
Ltd (Russia); written communications with trade associations like the World
Nuclear Association and trade unions like the Federation of Oil Unions (Iraq)
and Central de los Trabajadores y Trabajadoras (Brazil); and from official na-
tional statistics, such as Statistics Norway (Norway) and Ministry of Petroleum
andNatural Gas (India). For example, for coal mining in India, we collected data
on the current number of jobs in Coal India Limited (India’s monopoly coal min-
ing company), and then collected coal production data for that year. Finally, we
divided the jobs data with production data to generate employment factors for
coal mining in India in the form of jobs/million tonnes of coal produced. We
used this second approach to collect the majority of employment factors
data in fossil fuel industries, nuclear, and a large portion of data for renewables,
especially for non-OECD countries.
In our dataset, we complied employment factors data on coal production in
jobs/million tonnes produced; uranium production in jobs/petajoule; oil and
gas exploration and production in jobs/thousand barrels of oil equivalent pro-
duced; biofuel production in jobs/million liters produced; oil refining in jobs/
thousand barrels per day capacity; and power plant O&M jobs in jobs/GW ca-
pacity. In line with past studies, for construction and installation and
manufacturing jobs, we collected employment factors data in ‘‘job years’’/
GW instead of jobs/GW, as these are temporary jobs typically occurring at
the beginning of the project development.15,17,40 Here, job years represent
the number of workers multiplied by the number of years they work. Then,
we converted job years/GW data into jobs/GW by dividing by the number of
years required for construction, which vary between 1 and 10 years for
different energy technologies40 (Table S1). For example, a typical onshore
wind power plant requires 2 years for construction; thus, we divided job
years/(GW3 2) to get jobs/GW data for a particular year. Our dataset for fuels
is further divided into hard coal and lignite, while oil and gas is divided into con-
ventional and unconventional (Table S4).
Data processing
In order to calculate current jobs and future jobs, we converted the employ-
ment factors dataset denoted by e= 1::E for energy technologies and j = 1::J
for job categories to jobs per common unit of energy or power capacity
(jobsPJ or
jobs
GW ) denoted jobintej . Then, we used energy-related output quantities
from the WITCH model to compute the total current jobs numbers.
Here, the WITCH model’s energy-related outputs are denoted as: yearly in-
stallments I ENe in GW; total installed capacity K ENe, in GW; fuel extraction
Q OUTe, in petajoules; and total primary energy supplyQ PESe, in petajoules.




















To compute future TotalJobs, the above was applied to the scenario path-
ways generated by the WITCH model in all 17 regions (see below) according
to energy quantities produced by the model in each of these regions (Fig-
ure S15). We processed our dataset in R (the corresponding code and dataset
can be found at: https://github.com/witch-team/energy-jobs-dataset). To
represent labor productivity improvements, the employment factors in non-
OECD countries are assumed to converge linearly toward the mean in the
OECD regions by 2050. Only for future manufacturing jobs related to solar
and wind, the yearly capacity installments beyond the latest historical
manufacturing capacity data were assumed to be produced as a global pool
Figure 5. Regional changes in energy jobs from 2020 to 2050 for the reference and the WB2C scenarios
Values are expressed in percentage change. Socioeconomic projections (i.e., SSPs) are depicted with different colors. The global change in energy jobs is
denoted by the dashed lines. Regions are ordered by the mean changes across SSPs in the reference scenario.
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instead of individual regions. This was done as we cannot assume the future
manufacturing jobs would happen in the same countries as today.
Our employment factor dataset contains only one value per technology and
job category for each country. Therefore, we conducted an uncertainty anal-
ysis. For eachmacro-region in theWITCHmodel (see below), we used themin-
imum andmaximum values for each country, technology, and job category. By
combining these ranges with the ranges across SSP scenarios, we account for
the uncertainty of our results.
Using IAMs for jobs assessment
Prior studies on this topic that used computable general equilibriummodels or
macro-econometric models were able to show changes in economy-wide job
numbers, and were useful to explore the full economy-related job implica-
tions.20–22 By using an IAM, we are able to conduct work that is complimentary
to that. We are able to zoom in on the energy sector and understand the job
gains and losses by 11 energy technologies (coal, gas, oil, nuclear, hydropower,
solar PV, solar CSP, biofuels, wind onshore, wind offshore, solid biomass) and
five job categories (construction and installation, O&M,manufacturing, fuel pro-
duction, and refining). For example, our work would be useful to understand the
extent of job losses under the WB2C scenario in, say, Indian or Chinese coal
mining industries. Moreover, our analysis also allows us to show that the largest
direct jobsgains under stringent climate policieswouldbe inmanufacturing and
could lead to interestingdynamicswherecountries compete for these new jobs.
The WITCH model
We used the WITCH model with two climate policy scenarios and three
different socioeconomic assumptions to create six pathways of energy-econ-
omy development. WITCH is an IAM developed and maintained at the RFF-
CMCC European Institute on Economics and the Environment and is designed
to assess climate change mitigation and adaptation policies.41,42 It is a global
dynamic model that integrates into a unified framework the most important
drivers of climate change and an inter-temporal optimal growth model cap-
tures the long-term economic growth dynamics. In the model, a compact rep-
resentation of the energy sector is fully integrated (hard linked) with the rest of
the economy so that energy investments and resources are chosen optimally,
together with the other macroeconomic variables.
WITCHrepresents theworld in a set of a varyingnumberofmacro-regions; for
the present study, the version with 17 representative regions has been used
(Figure S15). For each, it generates the optimal mitigation strategy for the long
term (from 2005 to 2100) as a response to a carbon price compatible with
external constraints on emissions. A modeling mechanism aggregates the na-
tional policies on emission reduction or on the energy mix into the WITCH re-
gions. Finally, a distinguishing feature of the WITCH model is the endogenous
representation of research and development (R&D) diffusion and innovation
processes that allows a description of how R&D investments in energy effi-
ciency and carbon-free technologies integrate the mitigation options currently
available. Non-CO2 emissions in energy and industry are endogenously
modeled with potentials derived from the literature (marginal abatement cost
curves). Projections for agriculture, land use, land-use change, and forestry
emissions and food indicators are derived from the Global Biosphere Manage-
ment Model (dynamic look-up of emissions depending on climate policy and
biomass-energy use), calibrated on historical emissions and food demand
(from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Food and
AgricultureOrganization, EmissionDatabase forGlobal AtmosphericResearch)
Scenario design
Our paper is based on six scenario pathways along two dimensions: with and
without climate policy and varying socioeconomic parameters. With respect to
Figure 6. Primary energy mix for two scenarios WB2C and reference and its associated pathways
The figure shows primary energy mix from 2020 and 2100 under both WB2C and reference scenarios and their pathways under SSPs.
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the former, our reference scenario is based on the currently implemented pol-
icies, which are assumed to continue in the future, keeping constant the rela-
tive regional emission abatement from the SSP-related baseline scenario,
while the climate policy scenario ramps up the currently implemented policies
(until 2020) to restrict the global temperature increase toWB2C. For theWB2C
scenario, we used the globally estimated peak carbon budget (742 GtCO2 for
the period 2011–2100)34 left to meet the WB2C target.
The socioeconomic parameters for the second dimension are based on the
SSPs, which were developed by climate scientists, energy modelers, and
economists. The SSPs are qualitative storylines that describe pathways for de-
mographics and economics change until the end of the century.43–45 Over
time, several studies have quantified these qualitative SSP storylines making
projections for population growth44 and long-term economic growth.45 The
WITCH model uses these quantitative estimates for different SSPs42 to create
cost-optimal projections of energy sector changes (as these are hard linked)
for different regions to meet climate targets. To ensure the robustness of our
results, we created the reference and WB2C scenarios under three SSPs,
namely SSP1 (sustainability), SSP2 (middle of the road), and SSP3 (regional ri-
valry: a rocky road ahead), thereby incorporating their different assumptions
about population and economic growth among other factors.35 Our reported
job estimates are always for the middle-of-the-road’’ scenario SSP2, with
lower and upper bounds referring to the results using SSP3 and SSP1.
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